

C

Collective Security and Collective Responsibility in International Interventions



Antonio de Aguiar Patriota
Embassy of Brazil, Cairo, Egypt

Definition

Collective security is a concept that acquired universal acceptance with the entry into force of the United Nations Charter. The maintenance of international peace and security as foreseen in the UN system of sovereign states is outlined in Chapters VI, on the pacific settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII, on action with respect to breaches to peace and acts of aggression. Collective security presupposes an advanced commitment to uphold the inadmissibility of the use of force in international relations, unless authorized by the Security Council or as a measure of self-defense. The exercise of a collective responsibility through international interventions is associated with the debate on the responsibility to protect (R2P) civilians threatened by mass atrocities. A consensus on R2P was reached at the 2005 UN summit, which contemplated collective action when national authorities fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P was put to the test in Libya, when Resolution 1973 (2011) authorized all necessary measures to protect its civilian

population. As a result of differences over the conception and implementation of this decision, the 2005 consensus has become mired in controversy. In Iraq and Libya, military interventions have generated more problems than solutions. The inability of the Security Council to reconcile its mandate with contemporary challenges in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere calls for a renewed effort to reach an understanding on when and how the international community should intervene militarily, be it on the basis of collective security concerns or in response to a commonly shared notion of collective responsibility.

Collective security, as an antidote against international anarchy, is linked to the emergence of a system of sovereign states in Europe, which replaced the aspiration toward universal empire that lasted until the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Collective responsibility, as it refers to interventions for humanitarian purposes that are not strictly related to the maintenance of international security, is an idea that has acquired relevance in the context of recent debates on a responsibility to protect civilians in situations of peril. Intervention involves a deliberate decision to override sovereignty through military action. Not all interventions are undertaken in compliance with multilaterally agreed parameters established through international law. Sovereignty refers to a supreme political authority within a territorial community, coupled with the notion of the absence of an external superior authority, and

constitutes, to this day, a cornerstone of the interstate system.

Collective security has acquired legal status through multilateral institutions, as they developed after the two world wars of the XX century. The first formulation of a universally applicable system of collective security was contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. A more lasting expression of the concept was enshrined in the United Nations Charter and remains in force today.

Although alliances are sometimes described as instruments of collective security, this is not how the term was originally conceived. Henry Kissinger reminds us in diplomacy that “traditional alliances were directed against specific threats and defined precise obligations for specific groups of countries linked by shared national interests or mutual security concerns” (Kissinger 1994, p. 247). By contrast, collective security is designed to respond to any threat to peace. It represents an advanced commitment by the community of nations to enforce certain agreed strictures, as regards the inadmissibility of the use of force in international relations.

The adoption of the UN Charter on October 24, 1945, represents a landmark in the history of collective security. The maintenance of international peace and security as foreseen in the UN system is outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Under Chapter VI, member states commit to seek solutions by peaceful means, mainly by negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. If peaceful means prove to be ineffective and a dispute escalates into armed conflict, Chapter VII provides the basis for enforcement measures to restore peace. Enforcement measures can be nonmilitary in nature, such as arms embargoes and economic sanctions, or, as a last resort, may involve the use of force. Such coercive measures require explicit authorization by the Security Council. Article 51, on self-defense, represents the only exception to the prohibition on the use of force.

Both the logic of isolation, inherent to sanctions, and that of intervention, which underpins enforcement, constitute a departure from the notion of a sovereign equality of states. In this

respect, Article 2.7 of the UN Charter stipulates that the principle of nonintervention in the internal matters of states will not prejudice the application of coercive measures under Chapter VII.

Although the concept of collective security, as multilaterally articulated, has been a tenet of international relations for over 100 years, no predictable operative system for enforcement measures was installed either by the League of Nations or the United Nations. In practice the Security Council, as master of its own procedures, has determined the scope and the means for the application of Chapter VII measures over the past 75 years.

Enforcement has been outsourced to a variety of actors. The arrangements foreseen in the Charter, which would have provided the organization with the means to intervene militarily, were never concluded due to the tensions of the Cold War. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, attempts were made to revive a dormant Military Staff Committee for that purpose, to no avail. An opportunity presented itself in the 1990s as the response of the international community to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq revived interest in the full utilization of the possibilities offered by collective security, originally foreseen in the UN Charter.

The aftermath of the first Gulf War in 1991, coupled with the end of the Cold War, created the conditions, on January 31, 1992, for the first meeting of the UN Security Council at summit level. The final document of that summit pointed toward a new platform for coercive action, by including references to the fight against terrorism and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction as triggers for collective security measures. However, these indications did not amount to a new paradigm, capable of reconciling different strains of realism and idealism present in the debates at the time (United Nations 1992).

In the eyes of some, the so-called unipolar moment had cleared the path for the United States to lay down the rules of world order and enforce them unilaterally. Others, including non-governmental organizations such as *Medecins Sans Frontières*, considered that the unanimous support associated with the military liberation of Kuwait had paved the way for placing collective security

at the service of a moral conscience in world affairs.

A certain amount of innovation through Security Council resolutions was ensued, with an impact both on the objectives of enforcement measures as well as on the means to enforce them. Examples of the first are the establishment of tribunals to judge those identified as responsible for mass atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda. Meanwhile peacekeeping operations, originally conceived by member states as impartial and non-belligerent, became entangled in situations of so-called mission creep, in which they were perceived as taking sides. These attempts at collective reactions to security challenges in the Balkans and elsewhere generated precedents that had the cumulative effect of reorienting discussions on agreed parameters for coercive action. Moreover, the challenges posed by ensuring the full dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs resulted in a range of responses that shaped subsequent debates on international peace and security and still influence attitudes to this day.

In 1991 the Security Council adopted the most draconian disarmament and sanctions regime in UN history to ensure that Saddam Hussein would cease to pose a regional and global threat. UN Security Council Resolution 687, establishing the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire, demanded that Iraq "unconditionally accept, under international supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometers, and related production facilities and equipment." Cooperation between Baghdad and various inspection teams was never fully satisfactory and gave way to repeated standoffs. The option of resorting to military force to ensure compliance with Resolution 687, however, never met with a consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council (United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)).

One of the systemic problems such an option raised was the thorny question of selectivity. If noncompliance with Security Council resolutions were to elicit enforcement measures, why ignore other situations of questionable compliance? Divisions in the Council did not discourage

authorities in the United States from resorting to limited unilateral interventions such as operation "Desert Fox" in 1998. As the impasse between UN inspectors and Saddam Hussein's defiance persisted, however, the tragic September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States would play a decisive role in altering Washington's security concerns. The initial military responses against the Taliban in Afghanistan, on the basis of a right to self-defense, met with the solidarity and unanimous approval of Council members. The same did not apply to the perceived threat posed by Iraq.

The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 brought an end to the attempts by the United Nations to secure its disarmament, consistent with the terms negotiated at the end of the first Gulf War. The large-scale unilateral military intervention, undertaken without Security Council authorization, represented in itself a considerable challenge to the established collective security philosophy of the Charter. The situation only became more problematic when it was revealed that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to contend that the disarmament of Iraq had been secured through UN inspections, without the need for enforcement action, and in conformity with Security Council resolutions. It is also possible to sustain that it would have been particularly damaging for the legitimacy and credibility of the United Nations, had a war fought on false premises been authorized by the Security Council.

The precedent for evoking a collective responsibility to intervene forcibly in the face of humanitarian emergencies can be traced to UN Security Council Resolution 688, which authorized the provision of assistance to the Kurds, in northern Iraq, in the spring of 1991 (United Nations Security Council resolution 688 (1991)). Subsequently a succession of peace and security challenges in a variety of scenarios – including Rwanda, the Balkans, and East Timor – led UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to place the notion of intervention itself within a broader context than the one originally prescribed by the drafters of the Charter.

Kofi Annan describes in his memoirs, "Interventions" 2012, how he came to challenge conventional views on national sovereignty (Annan 2012). According to his narrative, through the trials of UN peacekeeping from Somalia to Rwanda and Bosnia, he arrived at the conclusion that intervention, under Chapter VII, need not respond exclusively to threats to international peace and security. As he reflected on a future of effective and legitimate collective security for the XXI century, he set out the case for humanitarian intervention as a lesser evil than inaction in the face of massacres or extreme oppression of innocent civilians.

A dilemma facing the United Nations was thereby laid bare: was the defense of the primacy of the Security Council in matters of peace and security as established by the Charter compatible with passivity in the face of ethnic cleansing or genocide? At the behest of Kofi Annan in the year 2000, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy assembled an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICIS) to try to respond to this dilemma. The Commission met under the co-chairmanship of Gareth Evans of Australia and Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria and produced a report that reframed this discussion by introducing the notion of a "responsibility to protect." (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001)).

In his opening speech to the 58th session of the General Assembly on September 2003, Kofi Annan expressed his concern with the deep divisions among the membership as regards the nature of international challenges in the realm of peace and security and the role played by enforcement measures to confront them (Annan 2003). He announced the convening of a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes to provide the organization with a collective security agenda for the XXI century. The panel circulated a report on December 2004 that dedicated an entire chapter to collective security and the use of force. The text underlined the importance of the legitimacy and the legality of coercive measures. But it also admitted that the UN Charter was not "as clear as it could be when it comes to saving lives within

countries in situations of mass atrocity" (UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 2004).

When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his own report entitled "In Larger Freedom" on March 2005, he stated that "we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it" (Annan 2005, p. 36). The ground was thus prepared for the inclusion in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome of a section on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Paragraph 139 thereof would start by encouraging the protection of civilians (PoC) in situations of conflict through peaceful means.

The UN membership, however, did not refrain from stating its preparedness to take collective action, including under Chapter VII, should peaceful means be inadequate in situations where "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome 2005). It is worth noting that gross violations of human rights were not included in this list. But a new international consensus regarding sovereignty and intervention seemed to be in the offing, under the acronym R2P.

A methodological proposal for implementing R2P was presented on January 2009 by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. It involved a three pillar approach, ranging from support for efforts deployed by states themselves to consensual cooperation in the provision of humanitarian assistance and finally through collective action in situations where a state manifestly fails to protect civilians in the four cases mentioned in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit (Ban 2009). In 2010 a new report by the UN Secretary-General on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect placed emphasis on strategies of prevention, in part as a way to address growing concerns regarding the multiple risks inherent to enforcement measures (UN Secretary 2010).

These conceptual discussions would soon be submitted to a concrete test as the so-called “Arab spring” manifestations in Tunisia and Egypt captured international attention between the end of 2010 and the first months of 2011. In the case of Libya, it was felt that the widespread and systematic attacks by the government against the civilian population could amount to crimes against humanity, as stated in the preamble to Resolution 1970, adopted by consensus in February 2011. This resolution included a referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, in addition to imposing an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze (UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011)).

The following weeks, however, would witness increasingly polarized debates, as the toughest reaction contemplated in the R2P lexicon came up for consideration. At first, discussions centered on the creation of a no-fly zone, applicable to all parties in the Libyan conflict, as requested by the Arab League. While such a measure represented an escalation in the response to the crisis, it fell short of a full-fledged intervention. When the US delegation proposed the inclusion of the code word “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, in a draft that started by deploring the failure of Libyan authorities to comply with Resolution 1970, the consensus observed only 3 weeks before it quickly turned into bitter division.

On one side were those who viewed an intervention as the necessary response to the violent repression by Muammar Gaddafi against unarmed civilians, as he confronted growing opposition to his authoritarian rule. According to this view, Libya offered a clear example of the manifest incapacity of a government to discharge its responsibilities in protecting its own people. This position, however, met with skepticism on the part of those who either feared that military intervention would further exacerbate tensions in Libya – with negative consequences for civilians themselves – or suspected that political agendas unrelated to the plight of civilians may lurk behind the invoked humanitarian impulse. The shadow cast by Iraq persisted as a reminder of how the widespread instability resulting from a military

intervention can dramatically outweigh its imagined benefits.

Rather than opening a window for diplomacy to ensure compliance with its terms, Resolution 1970 seemed to have generated “a barely disguised urge to intervene” in some member states, as pointed out by the former Ambassador of India to the United Nations, Hardeep Puri, in his book *Perilous Interventions* (Puri 2016, p. 202). The fact that the US government sought authorization from the UN Security Council for enforcement action seemed to reflect US President Obama’s personal opposition to the unilateral Iraq invasion of 2003. Notwithstanding that experience, and in spite of the misgivings expressed by Council members from all regional groups, the US delegation with support from France and the United Kingdom decided that a no-fly zone was insufficient and the time had come to act militarily.

Resolution 1973 was adopted by ten votes in favor and five abstentions, on the part of Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia (UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)). Although no vetoes or negative votes were cast, the division among Council members should not be underestimated. Moreover, even countries that voted in the favor of the resolution had serious doubts regarding the wisdom of the proposed strategy, as South Africa would clarify in due course. As events unfolded, over the course of 2011, not only did the Libyan authorities fail to meet their obligations, but violations of Security Council prescriptions were also committed by the proponents of Resolution 1973: weapons were supplied indiscriminately, and the no-fly zone was implemented only against the Tripoli regime. In a unilateral interpretation of the authorization to apply all necessary means to protect civilians, NATO military operations only ceased after Gaddafi was killed.

It is worth pointing out that the concept of protection of civilians had been used in the context of peacekeeping operations before the emergence of R2P. Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were adopted authorizing peacekeeping missions to protect civilians in several locations, including Darfur and Cote d’Ivoire, without giving rise to major controversy. By

contrast, the Libyan case, considered a first experiment with intervention within the R2P framework, became tainted by a host of questions regarding the real motivation behind the military action.

Even without questioning the good faith of those who believed Resolution 1973 provided the correct platform to protect civilians and bring peace to Libya, the unraveling of the country and the ensuing instability, which soon propagated itself to the entire Sahel region, bring to the fore the issue of the unintended consequences wrought by military action. In other words, an intervention that created more problems than it solved, while rendering life more dangerous for civilians across several nations, had clearly not met its objectives and became politically and morally questionable.

In the tense diplomatic environment resulting from the implementation of resolution 1973, Brazil decided to introduce a set of considerations on how to ensure that multilateral responses to challenges such as the ones posed by Libya did not make matters worse. A paper, circulated to the Security Council membership on November 11, 2011, by the Brazilian Permanent Representative, began by acknowledging the human and political cost of the collective failure to act in a timely manner to prevent atrocities such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In line with the reasoning that gave rise to R2P, it admitted that “there may be situations in which the international community might contemplate military action to prevent humanitarian catastrophes.” (UN General Assembly – Security Council 2011).

However it also pointed out that the world was suffering the painful consequences of interventions that had aggravated existing conflicts, allowed terrorism to spread, and increased the vulnerability of civilians. The perception among member states that R2P could be misused for regime change was explicitly mentioned. In conclusion, the paper suggested that, as it exercises its responsibility to protect, the international community should also demonstrate a high degree of “responsibility while protecting.” A set of prescriptions was put forward, from an emphasis on prevention to the development of Security Council procedures “to monitor and assess the manner

in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented.” A new acronym, RwP, was thus added to ongoing exchanges, as these thoughts came to be considered a desirable ingredient in the search for a synthesis between collective responsibility and collective security in interventions.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon would react positively in January 2012 by stating that “we all agree on the need for responsibility while protecting. In that spirit I very much welcome the Brazilian initiative to open a dialogue on these matters” (Ban 2012) while addressing the Stanley Foundation Conference on the Responsibility to Protect. Gareth Evans, one of the intellectual originators of R2P, would position himself along similar lines in an article, published a few days later, that starts by establishing that “The Western powers dismissiveness during the Libyan campaign did bruise them – and those bruises will have to heal before any consensus can be expected on tough responses to such situations in the future” (Evans 2012). And as he refers to RwP, Evans concludes that “the better news is that a way forward has opened up” (Evans 2012).

He may have been overly optimistic. The sad reality is that the world has not become a safer place as a consequence of military interventions, whether unilaterally orchestrated and carried out, as in Iraq, or multilaterally conceived and executed by a military alliance, as in Libya. In systemic terms, they have increased the level of mistrust among key actors within the international community, thereby limiting the scope for constructive diplomacy and responsible collective action. Syria has been a particularly tragic victim of such systemic breakdown. As a former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Youssef Mahmoud points out: “while many states may not have measured up to their people’s democratic aspirations, ill-advised military interventions by global and regional powers have made our world less secure and ushered more uncertain and perilous times for us all” (Mahmoud 2016).

Are we to conclude that current ideas on collective security and collective responsibility are inadequate in themselves? Or should the international community at large, or individual states, be

blamed for a manifest inability to translate the provisions of the UN Charter and the 2005 consensus on R2P into interventions that promote improved stability? It should be noted that both the UN Charter and the agreed language on the responsibility to protect contemplate intervention as a last resort. The RWP proposal, in turn, has added the essential point that under no circumstance can the use of force generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent. No doubt, neither the exercise of collective security nor of collective responsibility is served by military adventurism.

Enhanced multilateral cooperation for the promotion of international peace and security can be achieved within the course laid out by the UN Charter as well as by new notions on the exercise of our collective responsibility in the face of mass atrocities. In theory a multipolar world, such as the one that is emerging, could be more conducive than a unipolar or bipolar geopolitical distribution of power to a renewed adherence to the letter and spirit of international agreements. If no individual nation can singlehandedly impose its will and determine outcomes militarily in today's world, it follows that unilateralism becomes particularly dangerous, as it encourages disregard toward international obligations by all. The deleterious anarchical results of a surge in unilateralism, in a multipolar world, are not difficult to imagine.

A collective reaffirmation by member states of their commitment to multilateralism is the most responsible way forward. This will necessarily involve a correct understanding of the limits to what military intervention can accomplish and a readiness to learn the right lessons from past experience. Adjustments will be necessary, including a reform of the Security Council capable of conferring enhanced legitimacy to its decisions. There should also be scope for conceptual refinement. Perhaps collective responsibility should be operationalized exclusively within a Chapter VI framework. In turn, military intervention, for reasons that may include the protection of civilians, would automatically fall under a revised Chapter VII, with stricter procedures for monitoring compliance with Security Council mandates and observance of international humanitarian law.

The challenge that presents itself to the international community in the wake of Iraq, Libya, and Syria is perhaps best summarized by the wise words of a former President of the International Court of Justice, Mohamed Bedjaoui:

The task is to subject the use of force to ever more rigorous discipline, to confirm and develop the rules which fortify just recourse to it, eliminate the practices which lead it astray and to endow such recourse with the respect and recognition it inevitably arouses when it serves to found order upon justice. (Bedjaoui 1993)

Cross-References

- ▶ [Conceptual Evolution of Peace Operations](#)
- ▶ [Protection of Civilians](#)
- ▶ [R2P and Prevention](#)
- ▶ [The Libyan Conflict](#)
- ▶ [UN missions in the ex-Yugoslavia](#)
- ▶ [UN Security Council and Intervention](#)
- ▶ [Use of Force in Peace Operations](#)

References

- Annan, K. (2003). *Address to the 58th general assembly of the United Nations*. New York: United Nations. Available on <https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm>. Accessed on 18th March 2020.
- Annan, K. (2005). *In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all*. New York: United Nations. Document A/59/2005, March 21st 2005. Available on <https://undocs.org/A/59/2005>. Accessed on March 18th 2020.
- Ban, K.-m. (2009). *Implementing the responsibility to protect*. New York: United Nations. Document A/63/677, January 19th 2009.
- Ban, K.-m. (2012). *Address to Stanley Foundation conference on the responsibility to protect*. Nova York: United Nations. Available on <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2012-01-18/address-stanley-foundation-conference-responsibility-protect>. Accessed on March 16 2020.
- Bedjaoui, M. (1993). *The New World order and the security council: Testing the legality of its acts* (p. 6). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.
- Evans, G. (2012). *Responsibility While Protecting*. Project Syndicate (worldwide distribution), 27th January 2012.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (2001). *The responsibility to protect*. Ottawa:

- International Development Research Centre. Available on <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>. Accessed on 18 March 2020.
- Kissinger, H. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Mahmoud, Y. (2016). Afterword: Imperfect states, borderless ills and restive citizenry. In *PURI, Hardeep Singh. Perilous interventions: The security council and the politics of chaos* (pp. 203–210). New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Puri, H. S. (2016). *Perilous interventions: The security council and the politics of chaos*. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers.
- UN General Assembly – Security Council. (2011). *Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to United Nations addressed to the Secretary General*. New York: United Nations. Document A/66/551 – S/2011/701. Available on <https://undocs.org/A/66/551>. Accessed on 29 March 2020.
- UN High level panel of experts on Threats, Challenges and Changes. (2004). *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility report of the secretary-General's high-level panel on threats, challenges and change*. New York: United Nations. Available on https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/a_more_secure_world.shtml. Accessed on 18 March 2020.
- UN Resolution 60/1. (2005). *World Summit outcome*. New York: United Nations. Document A/RES/60/1.
- UN Secretary-General report on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect. (2010). United Nations. New York. Available on <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/report-of-the-secretary-general-early-warning-assessment-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/>. Accessed on 18 March 2020.
- UN Security Council Resolution 1970. (2011). United Nations, New York. Available on [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1970%20\(2011\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1970%20(2011)). Accessed on 19 March 2020.
- UN Security Council Resolution 1973. (2011). United Nations. New York. 2011. Available on [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20\(2011\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011)). Accessed on 19 March 2020.
- United Nations. (1992). Chapter 28. Decision of 31 January 1992 (3046th meeting of the Security Council). The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. In *Repertoire of the practice of the security council* (pp 813–822). New York. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure>. Accessed on 18th March 2020.
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. (1991). United Nations, New York. Available on <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/687>. Accessed on 19 March 2020.
- United Nations Security Council resolution 688. (1991). United Nations, New York. Available on <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/688>. Accessed on 19 March 2020.

Further Reading

- Annan, K. (2012). *Interventions – A life in war and peace*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Patriota, A. d. A. (1997). O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo: a articulação de um novo paradigma de segurança coletiva. In *Tese ao XXXIII Curso de Altos Estudos do Instituto Rio Branco* (2nd ed.). Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010.